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BOOK REVIEW
CHARTING

THE FUTURE:

THE SUPREME COURT

RESPONDS

TO A

CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920. By John E. Semonche. Contributions

in Legal Studies, No. 5. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press 1978. Pp.
470. $25.00.
Charting The Past
JOHN V. ORTHt

Between 1890 and 1920, the Supreme Court entered a reactionary
phase. No sooner had the nation attained economic maturity,' than the
Court proclaimed the ethos of capitalism to be the fundamental law of
the United States. The brave new world of the justices was a bourgeois
paradise, without income taxes or government regulation. In Pollock v.
Farmers'Loan & Trust Co.,2 they held that a national income tax violated the constitutional requirement that all direct taxes must be apportioned among the states on the basis of population. In Lochner v. New
York,3 they held that a state law prohibiting the employment of bakers
for more than ten hours a day or more than sixty hours a week violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Hammer v.
Dagenhart,4 they held that a national child labor law violated the tenth
amendment. With these fateful decisions, the Court embarked on the
collision course that ended in the constitutional stalemate of the 1930s,
Roosevelt's court-packing plan and the "switch in time which saved
nine" in 1937.
That, at least, is the standard version of American constitutional
history. After Professor Semonche's book, that version will have to be
revised. Looked at in detail, the Court's decisions during those three
decades accommodated the social needs of the new America more
often than not. The elderly men from comfortable backgrounds who
t Assistant Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A.B. 1969,
Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Harvard University.
I. The stage of economic maturity has been defined as "the period when a society has effectively applied the range of (then) modem technology to the bulk of its resources." This stage was
reached in the United States around 1900. W. RoSTOw, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 59
(2d ed. 1971).
2. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
3. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
4. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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occupied the High Bench in those years endeavored to do their duty
fairly and fully. As revealed by Professor Semonche, their approach
was not doctrinaire but pragmatic, that is, "attuned to law's use as an
instrument for the effectuation of certain ends."' 5 Over the years, they
set precedents that, although temporarily overshadowed by a few infamous decisions, provided a legal position upon which the Court could
fall back after its retreat in 1937. In a sense, then, the Court presided
over by Melville Fuller and Edward White was doing nothing less than
"charting the future."
To make his case, Professor Semonche takes his reader back to the
palmy days of the late nineteenth century. In 1889, the Supreme Court
was one hundred years old, and on February 4, 1890, its centenary was
celebrated with pomp and circumstance. In a fascinating ceremony at
the Metropolitan Opera House, the opulent bar of New York paid tribute to the Court. After this engaging overture, Professor Semonche
guides the reader through each successive term of court. For lawyers
and law teachers alike, this chronological method is an unexpected
novelty. Because of the thematic organization of lawbooks, legal scholars are unpracticed in thinking about the ensemble of any given term.
For his purposes, however, Professor Semonche's method has much to
recommend it. Not only does it reconstruct the context in which any
given opinion was written, but it also heightens the reader's awareness
of the result in each case and the shifting judicial alliances throughout
each term.
From the shadow of Pollock, Lochner, and Hammer, Professor
Semonche rescues cases broadly construing the federal taxing power
and upholding state and federal regulation of the economy. From the
early days of the Republic, it has been axiomatic that the power to tax
is the power to destroy, but it was left to the turn-of-the-century Court
to validate the use of the taxing power to regulate the marketing of
various commodities.6 Anticipating the future even more obviously,
the Court recognized that the commerce clause conferred regulatory
power over a wide range of activities (not, unfortunately, including
child labor). The national government could prohibit the carrying of
5.

J. SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS TO A CHANO-

the
ING SOCIETY, 1890-1920, at 426 (1978). Semonche's "pragmatism" is intellectually akin to1780
"instrumental conception of law" that Morton J. Horwitz has described as emerging between

and 1820, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 16-30 (1977).
6. United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919) (drugs); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S.
27 (1904) (margarine); In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526 (1897) (margarine).
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lottery tickets from one state to another,7 ban the interstate transportation of adulterated food or drugs,8 outlaw carrying women across state
lines for immoral purposes,9 prohibit the importation of prize fight pictures, 0 close interstate commerce to false and fraudulently branded arand wages of railroad employees
ticles," and mandate the hours
12
engaged in interstate commerce.
The Court also upheld numerous state regulations. New York's
ten-hour law was the exception, not the rule. Utah could forbid the
employment of miners for more than eight hours a day.' 3 New York
and Ohio could pass pure food and drug acts.' 4 Massachusetts could
make vaccination compulsory. 5 Chicago could fix the weight of
bread.' 6 In its zeal to uphold state laws, the Court even approved a
Boston ordinance requiring a license for public speaking on the Boston
Common.' 7 In practice, the due process clause as a restraint on state
action was a product of the 1920s, not of the earlier era. Professor
Semonche has calculated that, from the ratification of the fourteenth
amendment in 1868 until 1921, the Court found only thirteen state and
local acts invalid under the due process clause, a smaller number than
that invalidated in the five succeeding years.' 8
The judicial generation from 1890 to 1920 was composed of
twenty-six individuals-more than a quarter of the entire roster of
Supreme Court justices. Professor Semonche's assessments confirm
some long-standing judgments and conflict with some others. John
Marshall Harlan clearly emerges as a prophet, albeit one without a majority in his own time. His view that the fourteenth amendment incor7. The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
8. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
9. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
10. Weber v. Freed, 239 U.S. 325 (1915).
11. Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U.S. 510 (1916).
12. Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917).
13. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
14. Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U.S. 189 (1904) (New York); Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 191 U.S.
405 (1903) (Ohio).
15. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
16. Schmidinger v. City of Chicago, 226 U.S. 578 (1913). But see Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan,
264 U.S. 504 (1924) (Nebraska statute prescribing minimum weights of loaves repugnant to fourteenth amendment).
17. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). But see Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 514-16
(1939) (opinion of Roberts, J., in which Black, J., concurred) (freedom of speech in public places
may not be abridged or denied in the guise of regulation).
18. J. SEMONCHE, supra note 5, at 424-25. For an argument anticipating Semonche's, but
necessarily less comprehensive, see Warren, The Progressivenessof the United States Supreme
Court, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 294 (1913).
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porated the Bill of Rights,' 9 largely accepted in the 1960s, 20 was

consistently denied by his colleagues. More surprising is Professor
Semonche's rehabilitation of David J. Brewer2 ' and his debunking of

Oliver Wendell Holmes. 22 Brewer, it appears, was better than his rhet-

oric. Due process, for him, hedged in more than the deprivation of

property, 23 and his economic decisions were, in Professor Semonche's
term, pragmatic. Despite his fear of the power of government, he accepted many state regulations, 24 and despite his high opinion of the
rights of property, he repeatedly voted not to exempt corporations from
state taxation. 25 Holmes, on the other hand, is said to be less Olympian

than his rhetoric: "Any close reader of Holmes's opinions cannot miss
the obvious hostility that the Justice had for certain legislative measures, despite his oft-repeated conclusion that the judiciary should not
pass on the wisdom of such legislation. ' 26 In support of this proposition, Professor Semonche cites the restrictive readings the Justice gave
to the Sherman Act, 27 the Interstate Commerce Act, 28 and the Pure
Food and Drug Act.29

Professor Semonche is a successful revisionist. He forces us to
amend our pat answers to the old questions. But like all revisionists, he
19. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908) (dissenting opinion); Patterson
v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 463 (1907) (dissenting opinion); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605
(1900) (dissenting opinion); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 366 (1892) (dissenting opinion).
20. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (trial by jury); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy and
public trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation of witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)(assistance of
counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and unusual punishment).
21. J. SEMONCHE, supra note 5, at 244-45, 433.
22. Id. at 433.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 264 (1905) (dissenting opinion); United
States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 170, 181 (1904) (dissenting opinion) ("I cannot believe that the
courts of this republic are so burdened with controversies about property that they cannot take
time to determine the right of personal liberty by one claiming to be a citizen"); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 732 (1893) (dissenting opinion).
24. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Eubank, 184 U.S. 27, 43 (1902)(dissenting opinion); Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U.S. 198 (1901); Lindsay & Phelps Co. v. Mullen, 176 U.S. 126
(1900).
25. See, e.g., Citizens' Bank v. Parker, 192 U.S. 73, 86 (1904) (dissenting opinion); Adams
Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U.S. 185 (1897).
26. J. SEMONCHE, supra note 5, at 260.
27. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (dissenting opinion).
For Holmes's contempt for the Sherman Act, see HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrERS 163 (2d ed. M.
Howe 1961) and C. BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS 360 (1943).
28. Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (1908). For Holmes's hostility to the ICC, see HOLMESPOLLOCK LETrERS 163 (2d ed. M. Howe 1961).
29. United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911).
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runs the risk that in worrying about the old questions, he will lose the
opportunity to ask some new ones. The crisis in 1937 concerned the
power of the national government to stimulate and direct the economy.
The Court presided over by William Howard Taft and Charles Evans
Hughes had denied the Nation this necessary power. After 1937, the
Court reversed itself. Historians have assumed that the Taft-Hughes
era was merely a continuation of the Fuller-White era. Professor
Semonche exposes that assumption as facile. The turning point on the
issue of economic regulation was 1920, not 1890. In fact, the Court of
the gay nineties and the progressive decades had mapped out a bit of
the post-1937 terrain.
The constitutional crisis of the New Deal is not, however, the only
touchstone for American constitutional history. Because he is looking
back from 1937, Professor Semonche sees 1890 as a point on which
little turned. A revolution in personnel, rather than in ideas, makes it
his starting point. Between 1890 and 1894, five new Justices were
named to the Bench. They made changes, as Professor Semonche recognizes, but they did not seriously impair the government's power over
commerce and industry. Yet the changes they did make were often
significant in their own right. In the interpretation of the eleventh
amendment,3 0 for instance, 1890 is a recognizable turning point. During the post-Reconstruction era, the amendment had proved a strong
bulwark behind which the restored white governments of the old Confederacy could shelter, while repudiating the bonds issued by their Reconstruction predecessors. No state shall be sued by a citizen of
another state in federal court meant just that3 1-and that no Southern
state could be sued on its indebtedness by a Northern state,3 2 or by its
own citizens. 33 But the eleventh amendment entered a new phase with
the advent of the railroad rate cases. 34 Beginning in 1894 with Reagan
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co." and ending in 1908 with Ex parte
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XI provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
31. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886); Cunningham
v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883); Louisiana ex rel. Elliott v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711
(1883). Contra, Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs, 120 U.S. 390 (1887); The Virginia Coupon
Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1885).
32. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883). But see South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904) (distinguishing New Hampshire and asserting jurisdiction).
33. North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
34. C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 132 (1972).
35. 154 U.S. 362 (1894).
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Young, 36 the Justices charted a course around the amendment by mak-

ing state officers surrogates for their states. The jurisprudence of the
eleventh amendment entered its latest phase in the 1890s. Its future
was to be the continuing revelation of ways to escape its effect. 37 Concentration on the economic issues in the 1930s, however, obscures this
useful bit of mapmaking.
Each issue that confronts the Court has, of course, its own special
future. It is easy to portray the Justices from 1920 to 1937 as darkly
reactionary. With respect to the preeminent constitutional issue of the
day, they undoubtedly were. But in other areas they, too, charted the
future. In 1961, in Mafpp v. Ohio, 8 the Warren Court fired the first shot
in what has been called the "due process revolution. 3 9 In less than a
decade, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was interpreted to require strict compliance by state and local police with the
key provisions of the Bill of Rights. Yet that historic development was
prefigured by decisions in the twenties and thirties. From the Slaughter-House Cases4" in 1873 until 1923, the promise of the fourteenth
amendment was consistently denied. The states had a free hand in
criminal law and procedure. Then, in Moore v. Dempsey4 in 1923, the
Court ruled that the fourteenth amendment gave criminal defendants
in state courts the right to a real trial, not a bogus, mob-dominated one.
Within the next decade and half, the Court held that the due process
clause confers the right to an unbiased judge42 and, in capital cases, to
the assistance of counsel.43 It overturned convictions based on perjured
testimony4 or coerced confessions. 4 1 Finally, in the midst of the economic crisis, the Court laid down the "fundamental fairness" test for
determining which provisions of the Bill of Rights were absorbed in the
due process clause. 6 In criminal justice, then, the periods of American
constitutional history run from 1873 to 1923, from 1923 to 1961, and
36. 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (state action for purposes of fourteenth amendment but not for purposes of eleventh amendment).
37. See Comment, Avoiding the Eleventh Amendment:A Survey ofEscape Devices, 1977 ARIz.
ST. L. J. 625. But see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (eleventh amendment bars recovery
of retroactive welfare benefits wrongfully denied by state officials).
38. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
39. F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 6 (1970).
40. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
41. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
42. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
43. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
44. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
45. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
46. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) ("Does it violate those 'fundamental prin-
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from 1961 to the present (with premonitory signs of the last era in its
immediate predecessor).
In the history of American civil rights and civil liberties, neither
1890 nor 1920 (nor, for that matter, 1937) marks a turning point. During the post-Reconstruction era, in the 1870s and 1880s, the Supreme
Court virtually nullified the fourteenth amendment and the civil rights
acts passed to enforce it.47 Until Brown v. BoardofEducation4 8 in 1954,

this inglorious tradition was upheld. As Professor Semonche recognizes, the Court from 1890 to 1920 refused the lead offered by the first
Justice Harlan.49 Instead, it complacently presided over a mushroom
growth in discriminatory legislation." It sanctioned Jim Crow in transportation5" and education.5 2 It upheld poll taxes and literacy requirements for voting, despite their obvious use to disenfranchise the black
race. 3 Since the plain language of federal law required it, the Court
did overturn the residential segregation laws that had been enacted all
over the South after Baltimore led the way in 1910.14 But it was under-

stood that what governments could not do by law, individuals could do
by restrictive covenant.55 In the history of American civil rights, the
eras run from the end of Reconstruction to 1954 and from then to the
present (with only a few premonitory signs of change).
On the rights of laboring men to organize, the Court at the turn of
ciples of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions'?") (Cardozo, J.) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
47. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629
(1882); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876);
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
48. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49. J. SEMONCHE, supra note 5, at 430.
50. C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 97-102 (2d rev. ed. 1966).
51. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Compare Louisville, N.O. & Tex. Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890) (state statute requiring racial segregation on railroads in the state held
not an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce) with Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878)
(state statute prohibiting racial segregation on railroads held an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce). See also Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 218 U.S. 71 (1910) (interstate carrier

may make rules requiring racial segregation).
52. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908); Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of
Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
53. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898). A decision invalidating the "grandfather
clause" as a means to disenfranchise blacks, Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), was
contumaciously evaded. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).

54. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (applying the equal housing section of the original Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1976))); see R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 108 (1975).

55. See Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (upholding racially restrictive covenants).
But see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (racially restrictive covenants unenforceable by
courts).
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the century was, as Professor Semonche acknowledges, no better than
its predecessor or successor.5 6 Indeed, a change in the judicial attitude
on this question came only in 1937.1 7 Since time out of mind, the common law opposed the collective efforts of workers to improve their conditions of employment,5 8 and the oracles of the law from 1890 to 1920
made no exceptions. In 1895, the Justices discovered in the postal and
commerce clauses of the Constitution the power of federal courts to
enjoin strikes against the Nation's railroads.5 9 But in 1908, they found
the commerce clause too narrow to permit Congress to prohibit the
same carriers from requiring, as a condition of employment, a promise
not to unionize (the notorious yellow-dog contract)." In 1915, they
found state police power inadequate to justify a similar intrastate
ban. 6 1 In 1917, on the other hand, they authorized an injunction to
protect yellow-dog contracts required by an employer.62 With respect
to labor organization, the periods of American constitutional history
run from earliest times to 1937 and from then to the present (with no
premonitory signs of change).
In light of Professor Semonche's research, the standard version of
American constitutional history must be revised. On government regulation of the economy, Professor Semonche demonstrates that the appropriate periods are 1890 to 1920, 1920 to 1937, and 1937 to the
present. Professor Semonche further demonstrates that on this issue
the earlier and later periods have more in common with one another
than either has with the intervening years. But even in the revised standard version much remains unchanged. On major issues of modern
law and society-labor, desegregation, criminal justice-the Court
from 1890 to 1920 was a cartographic failure. For the thorough documentation of this truth, we must also thank Professor Semonche.
56. J. SEMONCHE, supra note 5, at 430-31.

57. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (authorizing an injunction to prevent interference
with rights under the National Labor Relations Act); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act). On the significance of Hague, see Gibbons, Hague v. CIO: A Restrospective, 52 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 731 (1977).
58. See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896); The Philadelphia
Cordwainers' Case (Philadelphia Mayor's Ct. 1806), reprintedin3 J. COMMONS & E. GILMORE, A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 59 (1958); The King v. Journeymen Taylors of Cambridge, 88 Eng. Rep. 9 (K.B. 1721); Combination Acts, 39 & 40 Geo. 3 c. 106
(1800), 39 Geo. 3 c. 81 (1799); The Statute of Labourers, 25 Edw. 3 st.1 (1351); Ordinance of
Labourers, 23 Edw. 3 (1349).
59. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
60. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
61. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
62. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917).

